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Abstract 
 Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) have become a very important defense measure against security threats. In recent years, 
computer networks are widely deployed for critical and complex systems, which make them more vulnerable to network attacks.  
In this paper, we propose a two-stage Semi-supervised Statistical approach for Anomaly Detection (SSAD). The first stage of 
SSAD aims to build a probabilistic model of normal instances and measures any deviation that exceeds an established threshold. 
This threshold is deduced from a regularized discriminant function of Maximum Likelihood (ML). The purpose of the second 
stage is to reduce False Alarm Rate (FAR) through an iterative process that reclassifies anomaly cluster, from the first stage, 
using a similarity distance and anomaly’s cluster dispersion rate. We evaluate the proposed approach on the well-known intrusion 
detection dataset NSL-KDD and Kyoto 2006+. The experimental results show that SSAD outperforms the Naïve Bayes methods 
in terms of Detection Rate and False Positive Rate. 
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
Peer-review under responsibility of the Conference Program Chairs. 
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1. Introduction 
An intrusion is defined as “any set of actions that attempt to compromise the integrity, confidentiality or  
availability of a resource”1. An Intrusion Detection System (IDS) is a set of components and techniques that aim to 
monitor network resources or computer activities in order to detect and react to any suspicious action. 
IDSs are usually classified into two categories2, 3: i) Misuse-based and ii) Anomaly-based. Systems that use 
misuse-base techniques need a database of known attacks’ signature (description) to match against observed 
activities or audit data. These systems provide very good detection results for specified well-known attacks. 
However, their inability to detect the unknown attacks is a major drawback. Anomaly-based systems, rely on models 
of normal behavior of the protected target, any deviation from this model is considered as suspicious. These systems 
are able to detect previously unknown attacks. However, the number of their false alarms is still high. 
Several methods have been proposed to detect anomalies4, some are based upon computational intelligence 
(evolutionary computation5, 6, artificial immune systems7…), others use pattern matching or rely on statistical 
approaches representing normal behavior8. These methods can be mainly grouped into three approaches: i) 
unsupervised approach where intrusions are detected with no prior knowledge of a normal/attack behavior. ii) 
Supervised approach where both normal and abnormal behaviors are modeled based on a pre-labeled data tagged as 
normal or abnormal. iii) In the third semi-supervised approach, only normal behavior is modeled using a pre-labeled 
data. The challenge of this last approach is to find an optimal discriminant function that can efficiently distinguish 
the target’s normal behavior from abnormal instances. 
In this paper, we propose a two-stage Semi-supervised Statistical approach for Anomaly Detection (SSAD). In 
the first stage, we build a probabilistic model based on pre-labeled normal instances, and we classify as anomaly any 
deviation that exceeds a defined threshold. This threshold is deduced from the Maximum Likelihood (ML) function 
and the p-value of chi-square () distribution. We introduce, for optimization, a variance-covariance matrix‘s 
regularization coefficient into the ML function. To reduce the false alarm rate, we propose as second stage, an 
iterative process based on a similarity distance and the dispersion rate of first stage’s output classes.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents some related work on statistical 
approaches for anomaly detection. Section 3 describes, in details, our proposed approach. Section 4 shows and 
discusses experimental results. We briefly conclude our work in Section 5. 
2. Statistical Approaches for Anomaly Detection 
Statistical approaches are commonly based on probabilistic models associated with training data. Several 
approaches to modeling normal and anomalous data have been applied to intrusion detection: Eleazar Eskin9 
presented a mixture model based technique for detecting anomalies within a dataset that contains a large number of 
normal instances and relatively few anomalies. His approach uses machine-learning techniques to estimate a 
probability distribution over this dataset and applies a statistical test to detect anomalies. 10 presents an anomaly 
detection technique based on a chi-square statistic for intrusion detection into information systems. The authors 
highlight the great computational cost when using Hotelling’s T² statistic and discussed the use of a distance 
measure based on chi-square test statistic instead. Authors in 11 proposed a prototype of a network anomaly 
detection system, with hierarchical architecture, that uses statistical models and neural network classifiers to detect 
intrusions. Data are gathered from network traffic, system logs as well as hardware reports. In 12, authors discussed 
the use of  a multivariate statistical analysis of audit trails for host-based intrusion detection. They also discussed 
and compared the performance of Hotelling’s T² test and chi-squared test. 13 proposes a statistical processing unit, 
that utilize application specific knowledge of the network services, to detect anomalous network traffic, specifically 
the less frequent attacks such as R2L and U2R. A metric is developed which allows the system to automatically 
search identical characteristics of different service requests. Where authors in 14 used Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
statistics to model and detect DoS as well as probing attacks. Authors in 15 proposed an approach based on Adaptive 
Bayesian Algorithm (ABA) for anomaly intrusion detection and compared it with Naïve Bayesian Algorithm using 
KDD99 dataset. Krueggel and al. 16 suggested an event classification scheme based on Bayesian networks to 
mitigate two main reasons for large false alarm. According to them, the first reason is the simplistic aggregation of 
model outputs in the decision phase. The second reason is the lack of integration of additional information into the 
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decision process.  The approach in 17 flows multiple steps. First, Kalman filter is performed on raw data. Then a 
Gaussian Mixture Model (GMM) is built, since authors assumed that the real distribution is a mixture of normal 
densities. Hidden Markov Model is, after that, applied to find the temporal dependencies above the different 
Gaussian components. Finally, Viterbi algorithm is used to detect anomalous events. 
Our work presented in this paper is strongly related to those cited above to the extent that statistical methods are 
applied. However, our approach slightly differs from theirs as we build a statistical model from normal instances 
only and consider instances of the rejected class as attacks. To improve the decision rule, we introduced 
regularization into the discriminant function of Maximum Likelihood. 
3. Proposed approach 
The main idea is to build a model representing the normal instances from which we define a discriminant 
function. A new instance is identified as anomaly if it does not comply with the predefined pattern under the 
hypothesis Null Ho and the alternative H1, regarding a threshold T. Instances identified as anomaly are then 
reclassified under some conditions based on a similarity distance and anomaly class’s dispersion. Fig.I. and 
pseudocode.1. illustrate the block diagram of the process’s main steps and the corresponding pseudocode.  
3.1. Discriminant Function   
Let      be an instance featured by n attributes.  Attribute’s value of this instance are assumed 
to be possible values from a random variable whose conditional density function is given by . 
Considering a unidimensional case, Fig.II.a shows the probability density of the attribute “src_bytes” in nsl-kdd 
dataset. The overlapping zones of the two distributions are indicators of instances’ separability. This overlap is even 
more pronounced in fig.II.b whose probabilities are calculated on the attribute “dst_bytes” of a subset with higher 
detection difficulty. 
Furthermore, knowing the class , we can calculate the a posteriori probability  expressed by 
Bayes rule 18 and given as follow :                         )                               (1) 
Where  is the a priori probability of normal instances.  
The posteriori probability gives the likelihood that the instance  belongs to the class. In the general case, the 
logarithmic expression of   is given by:  
                                           (2) 
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Fig. 1.  Bloc diagram of the SSAD 
Pseudocode.1.  SSAD 
Input : TrainDatasetNormal, TestDataset 
Output: TestDatasetLabeled  
Begin 
 Initialize parameters : precision , ,    
Compute ,     
Create the Discriminant Function  
Compute the threshold T  
 for each instance inst in TestDataset  
  { Compute        
      if  (   inst is labeled “normal” 
 else    inst is labeled “anomaly” } 
Stage 2 : 
Compute  ,    
Repeat  
for each instance inst in anomaly cluster 
if (d(inst,   d(inst,  ) && d(inst,   ) 
      label inst as « anomaly » 
else   label inst as « normal » 
Until number of changed label < 5 
End 
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Where    represents the discriminant function. 
The decision rule in a multiclass case is as follows:                                                                     
We assume that the data follows a multivariate Gaussian distribution. In this case, the discriminant function shall be 
as follows: 
           

   

         
Where   is mean vector and  is the variance-covariance matrix. 
To handle non-modeled instances and make the process semi-automatic, we introduce threshold verification in the 
decision rule. The goal of using threshold is to create an anomaly class with this decision rule: 
                                                   (4) 
From equations 3 and 4, we may put:                       

            
The expression         follows a chi square  distribution with n degree of freedom. Threshold 
expression becomes:                                                   

                                                            (5) 
3.2. Regularization 
The accuracy of the detection in the first step depends mainly on the discriminant function of normal instances. It 
relies on the representativeness of the variance-covariance matrix  of “normal” cluster. In order to optimize this 
function, we introduced regularization for   with the overall matrix variance-covariance. The regularization 
term is given by:            , where   is a weighting parameter and  .  
Two clusters      result from the first detection phase.  
3.3. Iterative Anomaly repartition 
In order to reduce false alarm rate, we added an iterative process that reclassifies first stage’s anomaly cluster. 
Each instance in this cluster will either be kept as “anomaly” or relabeled as “normal”.  
Let  and be the mean of normal and anomaly clusters respectively.  is the variance of 
anomaly cluster. An instance inst is labeled as anomaly if, and only if, distance (  is smaller than 
distance  ) and distance (  is smaller than trace( ). Otherwise, inst is labeled as 
normal. The process is repeated until a stable configuration is met (no changing labels). 
4. Experimental Results and Discussion 
4.1. Datasets  
Experiments were carried out using NSL-KDD19 and Kyoto 2006+ 20 datasets. 
a.  b. 
Fig. II. Probability density  function of training dataset (a) Low difficulty (b) Hight difficulty instances  
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4.1.1. NSL-KDD 
NSL-KDD dataset is the refined version of KDDcup99 known for some deficiencies mentioned in 21. It has 
numerous advantages over the original KDD data set like the absence of redundant records or the estimation of the 
difficulty level of each instance. 
The dataset contains a large volume of network TCP connections, the results of 5 weeks of capture in the Air 
force network. Each connection consists of 41 attributes plus a label of either normal or a type of attack. Simulated 
attacks fall into one of the four following categories 5 DOS, U2R, R2L or PROBE. 
4.1.2. Kyoto 2006+ 
Kyoto 2006+ dataset is built on 3 years of real traffic data (from Nov. 2006 to Aug. 2009) which are obtained 
from diverse types of honeypots in Kyoto University22. It consists of 14 statistical features derived from KDD Cup 
99’ dataset as well as 10 additional features to further analyse and evaluate network IDSs23. Traffic was collected 
to/from 348 honeypots deployed inside and outside of Kyoto University. All traffic was thoroughly inspected using 
three security softwares: SNS7160 IDS, Clam AntiVirus, Ashula and since Apr.2010, snort was added.  We used in 
our experiments traffic data from 2009 captures. 
Table.1 and Table.2 describe the composition of multiple subsets, from the data described above, used to test and 
compare SSAD to other statistical methods. 
4.2. Experimental Results 
Experiments were carried out using Windows® 8-64 bit operating system with core i7 processor running at 2.40 
GHz and 8 GB RAM. The first phase parameters were set to: = 0.8,   =0.6, ε (precision) =80%. These values 
were chosen after several tests and were selected to be those that give the best results.  
The accuracy of any intrusion detection system is determined by true positive rate     ) and 
false positive rate (     ). The detection rate is expected to be as high as possible, while the false 
positive rate is expected to be as low as possible. 
As can be seen in fig.III, SSAD outperforms Naïve Bayes in terms of TPR and FPR. Even though, Kyoto 2006+ 
dataset is more challenging than nslKDD, which was created more than a decade ago. 
 
   Table 1.  Experimental subsets of NSL-KDD 
Subset Normal Anomaly Size 
Kdd_1 9711 12833 22544 
Kdd_2 8131 6720 14851 
Kdd_3 23881 5822 29703 
Kdd_4 25844 18711 44555 
Kdd_5 48366 11040 59406 
Kdd_6 50165 24093 74258 
   Table 2.  Experimental subsets of Kyoto 2006+ 
Subset Normal Anomaly Size 
Kyoto_1 60341 8912 69253 
Kyoto_2 120806 17701 138507 
Kyoto_3 181119 26641 207760 
Kyoto_4 241430 35584 277014 
Kyoto_5 301784 44483 346267 
Kyoto_6 1605096 213910 1819006 
b. a. 
Fig. III. Experimental results (a) nslKDD dataset (b) Kyoto 2006+ dataset 
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5. Conclusion 
In this paper, we present a semi-supervised statistical approach for network anomaly detection (SSAD). The first 
step of the approach is to build a model of normal instances, a threshold is then established and a classification is 
made based on H0 and H1 hypothesis. A second step is proposed to reduce the false positive rate. It consists on 
reclassifying anomaly instances (from the first step) using a similarity distance and anomaly class’s dispersion. 
Comparative tests using nslKDD and Kyoto 2006+ datasets show that this approach has promising results. As future 
work, we plan to explore other probabilistic distribution, consider the online detection and evaluate our solution 
using more challenging datasets. 
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